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Content
Lee & McLeod
•	This review evaluates existing theory and research pertaining to the cognitive media effects of agenda setting, priming, 
and framing.
•	Accessibility-based explanations typically used to account for agenda-setting and priming effects are shown to be inadequate. 
•	Judged usability, an evaluation of whether a consideration is useful in making subsequent judgments, is suggested as a 
common mediator shaping cognitive media effects.
•	Theory and research are synthesized into a Judged Usability Model, representing the common psychological processes of 
agenda setting, framing, and priming.
•	At	the	heart	of	the	Judged	Usability	Model	is	the	equation:	Judgment	=	∑Ui * Ei, where Ui is the judged usability of 
consideration i, and Ei is the evaluation of the target on consideration i. 
•	Judged	usability	is	further	broken	down	into	the	equation:	JU	=	∑	Ii * Ri , where Ii is the perceived importance of 
consideration i, and Ri is the perceived relevance of consideration i. 
•	The influence of judged usability standards is moderated by the judged certainty of each of these judgments.
•	The Judged Usability Model raises the prospect of reverse agenda setting and reverse priming, the potential for a message 
to reduce the importance of a judgment consideration.
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Introduction
Our review of theory and research on cognitive media ef-
fects begins by examining the existing literature on the 
cognitive effects of mass communication, which promi-
nently features three related effects: agenda setting, fram-
ing, and priming. Each of these areas has generated a 
voluminous stream of research. Moreover, researchers have 
made numerous attempts to articulate their similarities and 
differences, as well as the nature of their interrelationships. 
While some scholars have argued that these media effects 
perspectives have commonalities, but are conceptually dis-
tinct (Kosicki, 1993; Maher, 2001; Scheufele, 2000), others 
have asserted that one of these effects, agenda setting in 
particular, may subsume the others (Iyengar & Simon, 
1993; McCombs & Ghanem, 2001; McCombs, Shaw, & 
Weaver, 1997). 
Our review of the cognitive effects literature suggests 
that there are common psychological processes shared by 
agenda-setting, framing, and priming effects. From our 
perspective, they share a concern for how mass media influ-
ence the relative importance and relevance of considerations 
(such as particular issues and certain aspects of an issue) used to 
make subsequent judgments. For agenda setting, selective me-
dia attention leads people to perceive that issues featured 
in news stories are important, relevant, or both to the judg-
ment task of naming the most important problem (MIP) 
facing the nation. Framing effects concern how the narra-
tive structure of a news story influences the importance, 
relevance, or both of certain considerations in judging ac-
tors or issues featured in the story. Media priming effects 
involve rendering certain considerations (usually issues) 
featured in a message more important, relevant, or both to 
the evaluation of politicians. Thus, each of these cognitive 
effects models involves media messages that elevate fea-
tured cognitive considerations used in making subsequent 
judgments.
There have been several attempts to articulate an under-
lying model to represent the cognitive concepts and pro-
cesses at the heart of these cognitive effects. In reviewing 
the literature, we found that insufficient attention has been 
paid to the impact of media messages on the extent to which 
the featured consideration is deemed usable for a given 
judgment, namely, judged usability  (higgins, 1996; Price 
& Tewksbury, 1997). In fact, findings suggest that those 
cognitive effects models are a product of substantiating the 
usability of a consideration for a given judgment (Althaus & 
Kim, 2006; Geer, 1991; Miller, 2007; Miller & Krosnick, 
2000; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). Thus, judged us-
ability is an important mediator that shapes cognitive media 
effects like agenda-setting, framing, and priming effects. As 
such, cognitive effects models should take usability judg-
ments into account. 
To that end, we propose a revised model of cognitive ef-
fects, which we label the Judged Usability Model. This 
model builds on past models by considering not only audi-
ence members’ evaluations of a particular consideration (e.g., 
agreeing or disagreeing that carrying a concealed gun pro-
tects the bearer), but also their assessments of the usability 
of that consideration for a given judgment (e.g., importance 
and relevance of the self-protection consideration to the 
enactment of concealed carry laws). It recognizes consider-
ation evaluation and usability as distinct cognitive assess-
ments. 
Moreover, our inclusion of judged usability leads us to 
the revelation that messages may not just elevate a particular 
consideration, but message content may actively suppress a 
consideration, rendering it less usable for subsequent judg-
ments. As a logical derivative of our judged usability model, 
therefore, we introduce the reverse agenda setting and re-
verse priming hypotheses–the ability of media messages to 
suppress certain considerations from serving as a judgment 
standard–as a particular type of media effect that is theo-
retically integrated with its priming counterpart in a larger 
theoretical model of cognitive media effects.
Our review begins with an assessment of the cognitive 
effects literature and the existing models that have been used 
to represent the underlying processes involved in these cog-
nitive effects. This literature review leads us to reconsider 
the relationships between these cognitive effects, which then 
inspired us to develop our revised cognitive effects model, 
the Judged Usability Model. With this new model as our 
point of departure, we discuss the potential for reverse agen-
da setting and reverse priming, which may open a new av-
enue for cognitive effects research. 
Overview of Agenda Setting, Priming, 
and Framing
We begin our articulation of a new comprehensive model of 
cognitive media effects by examining the major existing 
Judged Usability Model
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strands of research in the cognitive effects domain, namely, 
agenda setting, framing, and priming. In doing so, we rec-
ognize that a considerable amount of scholarly attention has 
been devoted to explicating their theoretical similarities and 
dissimilarities, as well as the nature of their relationship to 
each other. 
Agenda Setting
Grounded in Cohen’s (1963) often-cited insight that the press 
“may not be successful much of the time in telling people 
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about” (p. 13), McCombs and Shaw’s 
(1972) seminal research on agenda setting shows that mass 
media have the ability to influence public agendas in accor-
dance with media agendas. Specifically, the researchers 
found a strong correlation between the rank-order of local 
and national news media agendas, on the one hand, and the 
rank-order of issues that participants named as nationally 
important, on the other. 
The early work on agenda setting focused largely on 
replicating the original findings and identifying contingent 
conditions (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Scholars generally 
affirmed the robustness of news media’s agenda-setting abil-
ity (e.g., Benton & Frazier, 1976; Cook et al., 1983; Shaw & 
McCombs, 1977; Weaver, Graber, McCombs, & Eyal, 1981). 
For example, Benton and Frazier (1976) found that newspa-
pers were not only capable of shaping public agenda, but also 
effective at increasing awareness and knowledge of proposed 
solutions to public issues. Moreover, scholars (e.g., Cook et 
al., 1983; Shaw & McCombs, 1977; Weaver et al., 1981) found 
that not only ordinary citizens’ agendas, but also political 
elites’ agendas correspond to issues to which news media 
pay attention. Regarding the concern that public agendas 
may be driven by real-world cues rather than by media cov-
erage of issues, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrated in 
a series of experiments that news coverage alone is sufficient 
to shape citizens’ perceptions of issue priorities.
Subsequently, scholars turned their attention to variables 
that influence agenda-setting effects. Most notably, the need 
for orientation (NFO), “the tendency of an individual to seek 
information about an issue in the news media” (Matthes, 
2006, p. 2), has been found to influence the extent to which 
agenda-setting effects emerge—those who experience a high 
need for cognition are more susceptible to agenda setting 
than those who do not (McCombs & Weaver, 1973; Weaver, 
1977, 1980). Later scholars have concluded that NFO is a 
predictor of agenda-setting effects (e.g., N. y. Lee, 2016; 
Matthes, 2008). Likewise, political involvement (Rogers, 
hart, & Dearing, 1997), the type of information source 
(Carpentier, 2014), and the amount of direct experience with 
the issue in question (McCombs & Estrada, 1997) were 
found to influence agenda-setting effects. 
The emergence of new forms of news media such as on-
line news, cable TV news channels, and blogs has helped 
agenda-setting research continue to grow. Researchers (e.g., 
Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Waal & Schönbach, 2008) 
found that the online newspapers were able to direct public 
attention to certain issues just like print newspapers, though 
readers of print newspapers exhibited interest in a broader 
range of political and public affairs issues. Meraz (2009) 
demonstrated that non-traditional online news sources such 
as political news blogs also have the ability to shape the 
public agenda. Conway, Kenski, and Wang (2015) found that 
intermedia agenda-setting effects were present among the 
Twitter feeds of the 2012 presidential candidates, Twitter 
feeds of the Democratic and Republican parties, and news 
stories from traditional media. 
Priming Effects
Priming effects stipulate that issues receiving increasing 
media attention play a more important role than before in 
evaluating political figures. The priming hypothesis was first 
proposed by Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982) based on the 
speculation that agendas set by the media may alter the 
standards citizens use in evaluating the president; that is, for 
example, if national defense is considered an important is-
sue, then how that issue is handled becomes increasingly 
important in evaluating the performance of the president. 
Their experiments demonstrated that news coverage of var-
ious issues including national defense, pollution, and infla-
tion strengthened the correlation between evaluations of 
respective policy issues and judgments of President Carter’s 
job performance. 
Subsequently, scholars labored to test the hypothesis 
across topics and methodologies. Adding generalizability, a 
wide variety of topics have been found to be responsive to 
media attention including, but not limited to, foreign policy 
(Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2017), war 
(Althaus & Kim, 2006; Iyengar & Simon, 1993), energy 
policy, national defense, inflation (Iyengar, Kinder, Peters, 
Judged Usability Model
21
& Krosnick, 1984), crime (Valentino, 1999), racial attitudes 
(Luttig & Callaghan, 2016; Skinner & Cheadle, 2016) and 
economic recession (Pan & Kosicki, 1997). These studies 
have demonstrated that the media are capable of promoting 
issues as a political evaluation standard. It is interesting to 
note, however, that issues that are already highly salient may 
not be responsive to increasing media attention. Iyengar et 
al. (1984) found that the economy, which was a very promi-
nent issue at the time of the experiment, did not play a more 
important role when participants were exposed to economic 
news. The researchers conjectured that since citizens were 
already well aware of the significance of the issue, addi-
tional information did not increase the weights accorded to 
the issue.
Studies using various methodologies support the priming 
hypothesis. Iyengar and colleagues (e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987; Iyengar et al., 1984) conducted a series of experiments 
to demonstrate that it is exposure to news stories that causes 
the alteration of political evaluation standards. Field studies 
also found support for the priming hypothesis. By utilizing 
rolling cross-section surveys, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) 
documented that after the revelation of the Iran-Contra 
scandal, the influence of foreign policy on President Rea-
gan’s job performance evaluations significantly increased 
(see also Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Johnston, Andre Blais, 
henry E. Brady, & Jean Crete, 1992; Mendelberg, 2001; 
Mutz, 1998). In an attempt to more directly observe priming 
effects in the context of voting decisions, Druckman (2004) 
combined a content analysis of campaign news stories and 
an exit poll on Election Day, taking advantage of the 2000 
campaign for the U.S. Senate in Minnesota. This study re-
vealed that voters who were attentive to campaign coverage 
were more likely to base their votes on the issues emphasized 
in the campaign, whereas those who were oblivious did not 
rely on those issues when casting their votes. Additionally, 
Althaus and Kim (2006) utilized news coverage about the 
1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis from major television networks 
and public opinion data in order to track daily changes in 
priming effects. The researchers found that both recent and 
cumulative news exposure were responsible for changes in 
the impact of issue-specific attitudes on President Bush’s job 
approval ratings. 
Along with the basic media priming hypothesis, research-
ers have documented related phenomena such as the gradient 
hypothesis and the hydraulic pattern of media priming. 
Based on the associative network model (J. R. Anderson, 
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1983), which suggests that activation of a target consider-
ation will activate related considerations with a lesser degree, 
the gradient hypothesis proposes that news coverage of a 
target issue activates not only thoughts about that issue, but 
also thoughts about issues related to the target issue in de-
creased strength. For example, Iyengar et al. (1984) found 
that priming President Carter’s energy performance had an 
impact on evaluations of his overall performance, as well as 
his competence and integrity to a lesser degree.
On a related note, Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) 
revealed that the scope of mobilizing related considerations 
depends on the extent to which considerations are strongly 
interconnected. Specifically, the researchers found that evan-
gelical Christians were more likely to make ethical interpre-
tations of a stimulus material than undergraduate students 
presumably by bringing up more ethical considerations. 
Additionally, the hydraulic pattern of media priming sug-
gests that issues neglected by mass media are likely to be 
“pushed into the cognitive background” (Miller & Krosnick, 
1996, p. 82) because people have only limited capability of 
carrying issues at the same time (Zhu, 1992). Thus, increased 
weight attached to an issue by virtue of media focus on that 
issue takes place at the expense of other issues. In this regard, 
Krosnick and Kinder’s (1990) classic priming study illus-
trated that the rise of the Iran-Contra scandal as a presiden-
tial evaluation standard coincided with a considerable 
decrease in the impact of aid to blacks.
Framing Effects
Researchers from a variety of fields including psychology 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), economics (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), sociology (Goffman, 1974), and communica-
tion (Entman, 1991) have contributed to the development of 
two unrelated traditions of framing research. The first ap-
proach, often referred to as equivalency framing (Druckman, 
2001b), is rooted in the widely cited Asian disease experi-
ment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In their 
experiment, participants were presented with two alternative 
programs to combat an unusual disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. The first set of programs describes:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 
600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no 
people will be saved. 
It is important to note that both programs have the same 
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logical outcome, while Program A presents a risk-averse 
choice and Program B does a risk-seeking choice. The results 
show that 72% of the participants chose Program A, where-
as only 28% preferred Program B. The researchers presented 
another group of participants with a different formulation 
of the alternative programs:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 
nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people 
will die. 
Even though these programs are logically equivalent to the 
first set of programs, the preferences exhibited by partici-
pants were reversed—22% preferred Program C, whereas 
78% preferred Program D. These results illustrate that logi-
cally equivalent information can elicit starkly different re-
sponses depending on which interpretation is emphasized. 
Numerous studies conducted in various contexts have 
shown the robustness of equivalency framing effects (e.g., 
Liu, Choung, Lee, & McLeod, 2018; Nabi, Gustafson, & 
Jensen, 2018; Pedersen, 2017; Pedersen & Larsen, 2019; 
Zahry & Besley, 2019). For example, Quattrone and Tversky 
(1988) demonstrated that a policy framed as reducing the 
unemployment rate from 10% to 5% as opposed to one 
framed as increasing the employment rate from 90% to 95% 
received more endorsements due to a comparatively larger 
change ratio. Moreover, Lee, Liu, Chong, and McLeod 
(2019) revealed that displaying crime rates in different for-
mats (e.g., 296.4 million of 319 million Americans vs. 92.9% 
of Americans) produced distinct emotional outcomes, which 
then shaped risk perceptions. 
The other approach, referred to as emphasis framing 
(Druckman, 2001b), examines the differential effects of news 
stories that are organized around a different central structur-
ing idea. This framing perspective is rooted in Goffman’s 
(1974) conception that frames are a device that enables audi-
ence members “to locate, perceive, identify and label” di-
verse social events. Observing that journalists actively 
construct social reality rather than plainly describe events 
or occurrences, Gitlin (1980) defined frames as 
Persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and 
presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by 
which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, 
whether verbal or visual. Frames enable journalists 
process large amounts of information quickly and 
routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it 
to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient 
relay to their audiences. (p. 7)
Much of the early research in this tradition focused on how 
news stories are constructed as a product of interactions 
between journalists and political elites (e.g., Gitlin, 1980). 
Subsequent to that, researchers began to examine questions 
about the impact of these media frames on audiences, known 
as framing effects research. For example, Iyengar (1991) 
found that episodic news coverage of poverty, which “depicts 
public issues in terms of concrete instances,” led people to 
attribute responsibility of poverty to the poor (p. 14). In 
contrast, those who saw thematic news reports, which put 
“public issues in some more general abstract context,” were 
more likely to hold society responsible for the issue (Iyengar, 
1991, p. 14). 
Framing effects have been interpreted within a social-
cognitive information processing framework (e.g., Chong & 
Druckman, 2007b; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997; Price & 
Tewksbury, 1997, p. 199). At the first level, media frames 
tend to elicit particular trains of thought that are consistent 
with the frames. For instance, Shen (2004) showed that po-
litical ads focusing on the candidate’s character were more 
likely to evoke character-related thoughts than thoughts 
about their issue positions. Similarly, Price, Tewksbury, and 
Powers (1997) demonstrated that news stories highlighting 
different aspects of a plan to reduce higher education funding 
(e.g., conflict surrounding the plan, human interests, and 
consequences) led people to list more thoughts that are re-
lated to the frame they were exposed to than other relevant 
thoughts. At the subsequent level, thoughts generated by 
frames play an important role in shaping judgments that 
follow. When people on welfare are described as not deserv-
ing special treatment, for example, beliefs about individual 
causes of poverty (e.g., lack of effort or thrift) play a more 
important role than otherwise in making up one’s mind 
about welfare policy (Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997). 
The two framing approaches discussed above (i.e., equiv-
alency vs. emphasis framing) differ in their nature. Accord-
ing to Druckman (2001b), equivalency framing and 
emphasis framing make different assumptions about humans 
as an idealized decision makers. Equivalency framing il-
lustrates that individuals do not always make rational choic-
es by showing that people react differently to logically 
identical information (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). By 
contrast, emphasis frames do not assume preference invari-
ance. People may shift, for example, from supporting a hate 
group’s right to rally to opposing it because they come to 
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believe that public safety concerns trump free speech. Ac-
cording to Druckman (2001b), therefore, emphasis framing 
can be attributed to bringing up a substantively different 
consideration at the expense of alternative considerations, 
not to describing a single piece of information positively or 
negatively (or in otherwise equivalent terms). 
Another difference comes down to what Shah, McLeod, 
Gotlieb, and N.-J. Lee (2010) referred to as precision vs. real-
ism. Because equivalency framing preserves logical consis-
tency of the factual information while shifting the message 
frames, the locus of effects can be more precisely determined 
(i.e., high internal validity). Scholars who advocate the pre-
cision approach (e.g., Liu & Scheufele, 2016) argue that 
equivalency framing can help distinguish framing effects 
from other information-based outcomes, such as the second-
level agenda-setting, priming or persuasion effects, thereby 
lending “framing” research more legitimacy. 
It is obvious, however, that not all issues or events can be 
described in a way that the logical outcomes of given per-
spectives are identical. In fact, journalists “may alter the 
selection of textual packages, the facts, sources, and targets 
that correspond with the frame” (Shah et al., 2010, p. 87; see 
also Entman, 1993). As a result, for example, the contro-
versy over the development of nuclear power is likely to be 
described in a way that highlights the benefits of increased 
energy independence or in a way that emphasizes the poten-
tial environmental consequences of nuclear leaks (Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989), with each of these frames constituting 
qualitatively different alternatives. Though sacrificing the 
ability to precisely identify the locus of effects due to the use 
of qualitatively different information, emphasis framing 
excels in its ecological validity and is useful to investigate 
“the essence of public opinion formation” (Chong, 1993, p. 
870) because it attempts to reproduce variations in the real-
world media discourse. 
As a result of these inconsistencies in framing research, 
Entman (1993) critiqued framing as a “fractured paradigm” 
(p. 51). he maintained that “nowhere is there a general state-
ment of framing theory that shows exactly how frames be-
come embedded within and make themselves manifest in a 
text, or how framing influences thinking” (p. 51). In re-
sponse to Entman (1993), McLeod and Shah (2015) inte-
grated compatible approaches to framing research and 
proposed the Message Framing Model. Their model extends 
the traditional concept of message frames (i.e., a series of 
narrative scripts that organize information into a news story) 
2020, 8, 17-50
by identifying lower level textual units that carry a particu-
lar meaning that are assembled to create a message frame. 
Specifically, concept frames refer to the labels that journalists 
choose to describe certain objects or ideas (e.g., freedom 
fighters vs. terrorists), which signal different interpretations 
to the audience (also known as cueing effects). By selectively 
assembling words into sentences, journalists make state-
ments that further transmit preferred meanings, known as 
assertion frames (e.g., safety assertions that involve statements 
about whether current or future conditions are safe or unsafe 
from the risk). These assertions are then logically organized 
to form arguments, known as thematic framing, which are then 
assembled into a news story. Thus, the choices journalists 
make in constructing news stories can deliver meaning 
through each of these levels of the news story text.
Cognitive Psychological Approaches to Agenda 
Setting, Priming, and Framing Research
Among several psychological structure models, the Associa-
tive Network Model (J. R. Anderson, 1983) provides an in-
formative framework that identifies the psychological paths 
by which cognitive media effects (i.e., agenda setting, fram-
ing, and priming) occur (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Accord-
ing to this model, a construct (i.e., a psychological unit 
containing knowledge, goals, values, motivations, and affec-
tive states) forms horizontal ties with related ideas (J. R. 
Anderson, 1983). Thus, when a construct is activated by a 
stimulus material, thoughts related to that construct are also 
stimulated to the extent that they form strong ties with the 
construct (Collins & Loftus, 1975). For example, a news 
story covering disputes about laws allowing citizens to carry 
concealed weapons (CCW) may prompt concerns about 
threats to public safety for individuals who are predisposed 
to oppose such laws, while, for pro-gun individuals, it may 
conjure up images of self-protection using a handgun.
In illustrating the psychological paths by which agenda 
setting, framing, and priming operate, Price and Tewksbury 
(1997) suggested that such effects are a product of the inter-
action of knowledge store, current stimuli, and active 
thought. Knowledge store is a mental container where avail-
able and accessible constructs are located. here, availability 
refers to “whether or not some particular knowledge is actu-
ally stored in memory” (higgins, 1996, p. 134), while 
accessibility concerns the ease with which one can retrieve 
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available knowledge for conscious processing in working 
memory, or “the activation potential of available knowledge” 
(higgins, 1996, p. 134). 
A construct can have two accessibility states: chronic and 
temporary. Chronic accessibility refers to a high level of 
activation potential constantly carried by a construct so that 
it can be reliably activated across various priming conditions 
(e.g., reading news stories). For example, news stories cover-
ing controversies over concealed carry laws may reliably 
prompt public safety concerns for gun-control activists, while 
such stories may consistently conjure up images of success-
fully protecting oneself using a handgun for gun-rights ad-
vocates. Temporary accessibility is a state in which a 
construct momentarily has a greater likelihood of being 
activated as a result of being activated recently, frequently, 
or both (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). For instance, watching 
a nature documentary, which activates thoughts about the 
environment, may prioritize environmental concerns when 
a new large-scale development plan is discussed. 
Current stimuli refer to external stimuli that perceivers 
are processing (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). In mass commu-
nication research, current stimuli typically involve media 
messages such as broadcast news stories and newspaper 
articles, which stimulate constructs in knowledge store in a 
certain way to produce a particular response. It should be 
emphasized that not all features of a stimulus material are 
influential because audience members selectively attend to 
message features (Price & Tewksbury, 1997; higgins, 1996). 
For example, when reading a news story about the pros and 
cons of people carrying a concealed handgun, arguments 
supporting the practice are more likely to register in a gun-
rights activist’s mind than ones discrediting his or her posi-
tion as a result of selective attention and perception. 
Moreover, the extent to which the attended features of a 
stimulus material matches existing constructs in the knowl-
edge store is the other determining factor, besides accessibil-
ity, in activating a construct, namely, applicability (higgins, 
1996). In other words, applicability concerns how consistent 
attended features of a message are with the existing con-
structs in one’s knowledge store and, thus, operates before 
knowledge activation. As knowledge activation is a function 
of accessibility and applicability (higgins, 1989), an increase 
in construct applicability enhances the likelihood that the 
construct becomes activated. 
Noteworthy in the context of applicability is the concept 
of salience. Emphasizing the distinct contributions of acces-
sibility and salience to knowledge activation, higgins (1996) 
conceptualized salience as “something about a stimulus event 
that occurs on exposure, without a prior set for a particular kind of 
stimulus, that draws attention selectively to a specific aspect of the 
event” (p. 135, italics in original). In many instances, re-
searchers do not discriminate between different sources of 
salience including message characteristics (e.g., sustained 
discussion of a particular perspective, more air time given 
to a particular consideration, and use of striking images) and 
audience characteristics (e.g., goals and motivations). Al-
though higgins (1996) stressed that this approach is not 
entirely invalid, he cautioned that such a practice stands a 
chance of confounding stimulus attributes (e.g., framing an 
issue in a particular way) with perceiver characteristics (e.g., 
already accessible ideas such as political ideology) in discern-
ing differential contributions of such factors to knowledge 
activation. Thus, it is important to distinguish different 
sources of salience to precisely determine the locus of activa-
tion. 
Knowledge activation is a function of accessibility and 
applicability (higgins, 1989). Regarding their roles, higgins 
and Brendl (1995) found some “activation rules.” The first 
rule prescribes that the failure to attain a sufficient level of 
applicability due to, for example, exposure to vague stimulus 
can be compensated by strong accessibility. If the consider-
ation “conceited” is highly accessible, for instance, a descrip-
tion of another person that is tangentially related to both 
“conceited” and “self-confident” can activate thoughts about 
“conceited.” The second rule postulates that “when the ap-
plicability of a competing alternative construct is both strong 
and stronger than the target construct’s applicability,” activa-
tion of highly accessible consideration is inhibited (higgins 
& Brendl, 1995, p. 240). For example, although the consid-
eration “conceited” is highly accessible, reading a description 
about a hypothetical person’s behaviors that is strongly re-
lated to “self-confident” or that is more strongly related to 
“self-confident” than “conceited” constrains the impact of 
“conceited” on the judgments of the target person. These 
findings suggest that accessibility and applicability make an 
independent contribution to knowledge activation (higgins 
& Brendl, 1995).
Lastly, active thought refers to the domain of working 
memory, where ideas pertinent to the external stimulus at 
hand are actively processed (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). 
Constructs activated by external stimuli are transferred from 
knowledge store into working memory for conscious process-
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ing (J. R. Anderson, 1983; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). An 
important process occurs in this stage, namely that the us-
ability of activated thoughts is evaluated so that thoughts 
deemed usable for a given judgment are promoted, whereas 
unusable ones (e.g., inappropriate or irrelevant for a given 
judgment) are eliminated (Croizet & Fiske, 2000; higgins, 
1996; Martin, 1986; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Thus, “judged 
usability occurs after knowledge activation but before knowl-
edge use (higgins, 1996, p. 152, italics in original). For ex-
ample, a gun-control advocate who reads a news story that 
raises the self-protection argument may be led to consider 
that argument, but is likely to dismiss the idea that guns can 
contribute to the safety of the bearer because it does not align 
with his or her preexisting attitudes. As the self-protection 
argument is deemed untenable, irrelevant, or both, the indi-
vidual’s attitude toward allowing concealed handguns re-
mains unchanged, or even reversed as a result of stimulating 
contradictory thoughts (i.e., boomerang effects). In other 
words, though activated knowledge has a heightened likeli-
hood of being used in evaluations, its actual use “depends 
on the knowledge meeting some accuracy criteria rather than 
its speed or ease of activation or its simple primacy” (hig-
gins, 1996, p. 162). This long-known, but little-studied sub-
routine has been alternatively labeled as “judged usability” 
(higgins, 1996), “evaluation of construct relevance” (Price 
& Tewksbury, 1997), and “usability” (McLeod & Shah, 
2011). The important distinction between activation of 
knowledge and actual use of such knowledge suggests that 
people can be seen as “active rather than passive in their use 
of constructs, once activated” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 
193; see also Miller & Krosnick, 2000). 
It is important not to confuse applicability of message 
features to the existing constructs (i.e., applicability) with 
deemed applicability of activated knowledge to a judgment 
(i.e., judged usability). Though both phenomena concern 
relevance of two concepts, the former occurs before knowl-
edge activation, serving as a factor in transferring certain 
constructs to working memory, while the latter after knowl-
edge activation, regulating whether or not activated con-
struct in working memory can be actually used for a 
judgment (higgins, 1996). Unfortunately, however, some 
scholars simply use “applicability” to refer to two distinct 
phenomena. For example, Althaus and Kim (2006) defined 
applicability effects as an instance when “each priming epi-
sode generates associations between the primed construct 
and other constructs, stimuli, or judgmental contexts” (p. 962, 
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italics added). This definition confounds the fit between 
priming stimulus and existing constructs (i.e., applicability 
using our term) with the fit between activated construct and 
a judgment task (i.e., judged usability using our term). Be-
cause applicability and judged usability operate at different 
stages and have different implications for the knowledge 
activation and use process (higgins, 1996; higgins & Brendl, 
1995; Price & Tewksbury, 1997), scholars should carefully 
distinguish the two concepts. Therefore, in this article, we 
use the term “applicability” or “applicable” to refer exclu-
sively to applicability effects before knowledge activation. 
Within the framework of knowledge activation and use, 
agenda setting, framing, and priming are collectively seen 
as cognitive media effects as each of these models relates to 
the media’s capability of telling people “what to think about” 
(Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Kosicki, 1993). Spe-
cifically, agenda setting effects concern how media mes-
sages shape perceptions of what issues people think are 
important. Framing effects involve the impact of messages 
on what perspective to think about in understanding issues 
and events. Priming effects tell people what criteria to think 
about in making subsequent judgments. Each of these media 
effects can be viewed in terms of the psychological processes 
discussed above that illustrate how certain thoughts are 
generated and used during or immediately after processing 
external stimuli. Price and Tewksbury (1997) concluded that 
framing is an applicability effect as salient features of a me-
dia message render particular trains of thoughts applicable 
and activate those thoughts, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of using them. On the other hand, the researchers ar-
gued that priming is an accessibility effect as it concerns the 
retrieval of a certain activated issue to make subsequent 
judgments such as evaluating a political leader. They viewed 
agenda setting as “a particular instance of priming” in that 
activated issues become retrieved to make judgments about 
the relative importance of issues (p. 198).
Psychological Mechanisms of Agenda Setting, 
Priming, and Framing
Agenda Setting
While the relevant literature has expanded rapidly, the exact 
psychological mechanisms underlying the agenda-setting 
effect have long been assumed rather than empirically tested 
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(Carpentier, 2014; Kosicki, 1993). The most cited mechanism 
explaining agenda-setting effects is accessibility bias. Iyengar 
and Kinder (1987) were among the first scholars to argue 
that accessibility is responsible for changes in national im-
portance perception. According to this view, issues that re-
ceive increasing media coverage tend to be cited as the MIP 
because those issues become easier to come to mind among 
others.1  In other words, increased activation potential of an 
issue due to repeated media coverage leads people to cite the 
issue as the MIP when they are called upon to name the MIP. 
As a result, the volume of news coverage has been seen as a 
primary determinant of agenda setting. Many scholars fol-
lowed suit, suggesting accessibility bias as the primary mech-
anism for agenda setting. Most notably, Price and Tewksbury 
Table 1
Important Terms and Definitions
Phase Term Definition
Pre-activation Availability The presence or absence of particular knowledge in 
knowledge store.
Pre-activation Accessibility The ease with which available knowledge is retrieved 
from knowledge store for activation.
Pre-activation Applicability
The extent to which the attended feature of a message 
is consistent with available knowledge in knowledge 
store.
Activation
Activation (or knowledge 
activation)
The process of transferring knowledge from knowledge 
store to working memory for conscious processing. 
Activation is a function of accessibility and 
applicability. Activated knowledge becomes temporarily 
accessible from working memory.
Post-activation, but 
pre-judgment
Judged usability The process of assessing activated knowledge in terms 
of its importance and relevance for a given judgment.
Post-activation, but 
pre-judgment
Evaluation Valenced beliefs about activated knowledge (e.g., positive 
vs. negative, favorable vs. unfavorable, or true vs. false).
Post-activation, but 
pre-judgment
Importance Subjective judgments about the degree to which a 
consideration per se is worthy of attention.
Post-activation, but 
pre-judgment
Relevance how intrinsically linked a consideration is to the 
judgment decision one is about to make.
1 Accessibility effect should be distinguished from availability heuristic. The former refers to the state of readiness of a construct in one’s 
working memory for a subsequent activation (higgins, 1996), while the latter to experienced or estimated ease of retrieval of instances 
that belong to a certain type of event or class (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
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Empirical Evidence Draws the Accessibility 
Bias Hypothesis into Question
Scholars have raised a question about the validity of the 
accessibility-based explanation for agenda-setting and prim-
ing effects. For example, Takeshita (2006) argued that con-
ceptualizing agenda-setting and priming effects as an 
accessibility effect is tantamount to seeing those effects as 
“an almost mindless, mechanical response based on rote 
learning from the media” (p.276). Indeed, trivial issues are 
unlikely to be cited as the MIP or serve as a political evalu-
ation standard simply because they receive media attention 
or are easily retrievable from memory. For example, if the 
media pay a lot of attention to a president’s propensity to 
cheat on the golf course, something that may be easily re-
trieved from memory, we probably would not expect that 
golf malfeasance would be deemed an important problem or 
that it would be used to downgrade evaluations of presiden-
tial performance.
Shah, Watts, Domke, and Fan (2002) investigated the 
apparent irony of the rising of President Clinton’s approval 
ratings during his sex scandal and provided indirect evidence 
that accessibility bias does not explain the phenomenon. 
Their analysis showed that far greater media attention was 
paid to the issue than to any other important issues including 
the economy. Therefore, it might be reasonable to expect that 
the scandal was the most accessible issue at the time. Ac-
cording to the notion of accessibility bias, when people 
thought of President Clinton at the time, the scandal must 
have readily come to mind and the damaging nature of the 
issue should have undermined his approval rating. however, 
Shah and colleagues (2002) found that Clinton’s high ap-
proval ratings were a product of news content “that framed 
the sex scandal in terms of the actions and accusations of 
conservative elites, even though this coverage was over-
whelmingly negative of Clinton” (p. 366).2  These findings 
suggest that political judgments do not solely depend on the 
sheer volume of media coverage that results in increased 
issue accessibility. 
In fact, the exclusive focus on the volume of news cover-
age in agenda-setting and priming research only “strips away 
(1997) constructed a theoretical framework in which agenda 
setting, priming, and framing operate and concluded that 
agenda setting is an accessibility effect. According to them, 
agenda setting is an effect in which people cite issues about 
which they view news stories recently, frequently, or both. 
Moreover, citing the social cognition literature (hastie & 
Park, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), Scheufele and col-
leagues (e.g., Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) 
argued that agenda setting is a memory-based model, which 
assumes that people tend to make judgments based on the 
considerations that are easy to recall. The notion of acces-
sibility bias has since been widely adopted by researchers 
(e.g., Dearing & Rogers, 1996; holbrook & hill, 2005; Iyen-
gar, 1991; S.-h. Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002; Mc-
Combs, 2004; Sheafer, 2007).
Priming Effects
Similar to the case of agenda setting, priming effects—an 
increase in weight accorded to an issue—have long been seen 
as an accessibility effect. In their initial testing of the prim-
ing hypothesis, Iyengar and his associates (Iyengar et al., 
1982) speculated that an increase in weight is a product of 
the increased ease with which people retrieve certain issues 
from memory, which then can be attributed to an increasing 
volume of news coverage on those issues. That is, they 
viewed accessibility bias as a mediator of priming effects. 
With their speculation having gone unchallenged, similar 
mechanisms have been suggested as a cause of agenda-set-
ting effects. For example, Price and Tewsbury (1997, p. 197) 
concluded that “by virtue of its activation, and its direct 
proportion to the recency and frequency of its activation,” a 
temporarily accessible construct (i.e., a particular issue in 
the context of priming research) is activated and used as an 
evaluation criterion when people are called on to evaluate 
political figures. The accessibility-based explanation has 
been widely accepted by a range of scholars (e.g., Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001; 
Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Valentino, 
1999; Valentino, hutchings, & White, 2002)
2  One might argue that Clinton’s high approval ratings were a product of the good economy and his favorable presidential performance. 
however, Shah et al.’s (2002) analyses showed that economic factors such as real disposable income, the valence of economic news cov-
erage, and his presidential performance played a negligible role in encouraging his approval ratings, compared to strategic framing of 
the scandal.
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priming research. It is reasonable to assume that McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) saw issue salience as perceived importance 
considering the fact that the researchers operationalized is-
sue salience as the most important problem. Takeshita (2006) 
pointed out that:
McCombs and Shaw (1977) noted a similarity be-
tween agenda setting and the status conferral function 
of the mass media in that both ideas deal with the 
salience of objects. This suggests that the founders 
must have meant salience to stand for perceived im-
portance, because the concept of status conferral as-
serts that the mass media bestow prestige or 
importance on certain individuals and groups just by 
paying attention to them. (p. 278)
Empirical evidence that contradicts the notion of accessibil-
ity bias has also emerged. For agenda setting, Pingree and 
Stoycheff (2013) found that repeated presentation of topics 
without providing the reason why these topics were impor-
tant did not produce agenda setting for people who had low 
trust in media gatekeeping. Carpentier (2014) observed the 
accessibility of the target issue across different types of stim-
ulus materials (including a news story, a related crossword 
puzzle and a control condition) and found that issue acces-
sibility was enhanced regardless of stimulus types, but agen-
da setting was observed only when the issue was discussed 
in news stories. Min, Ghanem, and Evatt (2007) found that 
people distinguished personal agendas from social agendas 
among similarly primed issues. Furthermore, scholars (e.g., 
McCombs & Weaver, 1973; Weaver, 1977, 1980, 1991) have 
shown that people with distinct tendencies to seek informa-
tion about a particular issue displayed different levels of 
agenda-setting effects. The different agenda-setting effects 
documented here should not occur if accessibility is a pri-
mary driver of the effect, thereby indicating that agenda 
setting is not a product of “mindless, mechanical response 
based on rote learning from the media” (Takeshita, 2006, p. 
276). 
Regarding the roles of accessibility and description of 
issues in the agenda-setting process, Miller (2007) provided 
the most direct and compelling evidence. To “manipulate 
issue accessibility without corresponding content that im-
plies the issue is important” (p. 708), Miller (2007) utilized 
a word-search puzzle that contains words relevant to an is-
sue. A pilot test showed that conducting a word-search puz-
zle indeed increased issue accessibility. She compared the 
content-free (puzzle) condition with the news story condi-
almost everything worth knowing about how the media 
cover an issue and leaves only the shell of the topic” (Kosicki, 
1993, p. 112, italics in original). Though some scholars (e.g., 
Iyengar et al., 1982) argued that increasing news coverage of 
a problem leads to the substantiating of the importance of 
the problem, the process may not be as simple as it seems 
because:
political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate 
in which the opponents agree in advance on a defini-
tion of the issues. As a matter of fact, the definition 
of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of pow-
er; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues 
are because power is involved in its definition. he who 
determined what politics is about runs the country, 
because the definition of alternatives is the choice of 
conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power. 
(Schattschneider, 1961, p. 68, as cited in Kosicki, 
1993). 
That is, looking only at “content-free topic domain, devoid 
of controversy or contending forces” (Kosicki, 1993, p. 104) 
does not provide any explanation as to an important interac-
tion between evolution of controversial issues and how the 
public perceives those issues (Swanson, 1988; Weiss, 1992). 
From this perspective, “the content-free nature of the issues” 
that has been the primary focus of the existing agenda-set-
ting and priming research may be a critical flaw in the mod-
els (Kosicki, 1993, p. 104). 
A growing number of scholars recognize that enhanced 
accessibility may not be the primary mechanism of agenda-
setting and priming effects (Takeshita, 2006; Weaver, 2007; 
Willnat, 1997). At the theoretical level, Takeshita (2006) 
questioned the validity of accessibility-based explanation for 
agenda-setting and priming effects. To him, the accessibility 
bias model misconceptualizes “the transfer of salience” (Mc-
Combs & Shaw, 1993, p. 62) as increased accessibility (e.g., 
Scheufele, 1999, 2000). Indeed, scholars have used salience 
to refer to two distinct concepts–the ease of recall and note-
worthiness. For example, higgins (1996) suggested that sa-
lience can refer to both something about stimulus materials 
(e.g., striking images in news stories that draw attention) and 
readiness of certain thoughts in perceiver’s mind (e.g., goals 
and motivations). Similarly, young (1992), and Roessler and 
Eichhorn (1999) argued that salience involves both the per-
ceived importance and the ease of recalling an issue. 
There seems to be, however, little reason to see salience 
as accessibility at least in the context of agenda-setting and 
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ing the mechanisms of priming effects provides a strong case 
against the accessibility-bias hypothesis.3
As we discuss in more detail later, there may be no pure 
accessibility effects in political communication. To quickly 
reiterate, news stories’ typical functions of highlighting and 
substantiating a consideration inevitably affect both acces-
sibility and judged usability of the consideration that is being 
discussed. however, it is also noteworthy that not all indi-
viduals are motivated or able to judge the usability of acti-
vated constructs. Because judged usability “involves a 
controlled process” (higgins, 1996, p. 152), people lacking 
motivation and ability may be more likely to rely on acces-
sible constructs from working memory when making judg-
ments (see Devine, 1989; Kruglanski, 1989). Therefore, the 
relative weights of accessibility and judged usability of acti-
vated constructs can vary. 
Mechanisms of Framing Effects
Like agenda setting and priming, framing was once seen as 
an accessibility effect (Druckman, 2001a). For example, 
Chong (1993), Iyengar (1991), and Zaller (1992) argued that 
the extent to which certain considerations are easy to recall 
is the primary determinant of framing effects. Unlike agen-
da setting and priming, however, the accessibility-based 
explanation for framing effects has been retired relatively 
quickly as theoretical (e.g., Price & Tewksbury, 1997) and 
empirical evidence (e.g., Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997) suggests 
that framing effects are a product of how issues are described 
in a communicating text. 
Framing effects operate on multiple levels including 
availability, activation, and use of activated considerations 
(Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 
2007b). The presentation of alternative considerations about 
an issue in a communicating text renders those consider-
ations available in perceivers’ minds, a process tantamount 
to learning (Chong & Druckman, 2007b). Newly learned or 
existing considerations become activated and, as a result, 
become accessible by the virtue of the active processing of 
tions in which news stories provided different interpretations 
of the current crime rate (i.e., high vs. low crime rate). She 
found that agenda setting was observed only in the news 
story conditions and mediated by negative emotions aroused 
by the stories. her findings indicate that accessibility is not 
a sufficient condition for agenda setting as the accessibility-
bias explanation suggests. 
For priming effects, empirical evidence also contradicts 
the accessibility bias hypothesis (cf. Valentino et al., 2002). 
y. M. Kim (2005) found that despite the prevalence of news 
coverage favoring military action during the Gulf War, at-
titude toward a diplomatic solution had more impact on 
evaluations of the president’s handling of the war and the 
president’s overall performance than attitude toward mili-
tary action. her findings are aligned with the set/reset mod-
el (Martin, 1986), which stipulates that individuals tend to 
evaluate activated considerations according to certain crite-
ria before actually using them. In a similar vein, Althaus 
and Kim (2006) found that closely related considerations 
about the Gulf Crisis exhibited different patterns of priming 
effects in terms of effect size and direction, though the ac-
cessibility of these considerations were stimulated to a sim-
ilar degree. Their findings showed that the extent to which 
certain considerations influence political evaluations is more 
closely related to the tone of news coverage than to the 
amount of news coverage. This is another piece of evidence 
challenging the notion of accessibility. Furthermore, Geer 
(1991) demonstrated that even though the accessibility of 
important and unimportant issues were equally activated, 
only issues deemed important were cited as the basis for 
presidential voting decisions, a form of political evaluation. 
More directly, Miller and Krosnick (2000) conducted an 
experiment to assess the role of issue accessibility in priming 
effects. Their findings showed that increased issue accessibil-
ity did not mediate priming effects. Instead, perceived na-
tional importance of an issue, derived from the content of 
news stories, was found to mediate priming effects among 
those who were both politically knowledgeable and highly 
trusting of the media. Overall, empirical evidence concern-
3 Besides the debate over the accessibility bias hypothesis, two alternative explanations for classic media priming hypothesis have been 
proposed. Lenz (2009) argued priming effects, which is typically operationalized as a weight increase of an issue, is a product of learning 
and adopting preferred parties’ positions on issues. On the other, hart and Middleton (2014) proposed the projection hypothesis, arguing 
that “news causes voters to align their overall approval with issue approval” (p. 582). In the latest study, Takens, Kleinnijenhuis, Van 
hoof, and Van Atteveldt (2015) argued that media priming is not an artifact of learning or projection.
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demonstrated that changes in belief importance produced 
by message frames explain shifts in people’s attitudes toward 
the issue in question. The researchers also found that belief 
accessibility did not mediate framing effects. 
Also noteworthy is the distinction between framing ef-
fects and persuasion, both of which concern changes in at-
titudes or opinions. Nelson and colleagues (e.g., Nelson, 
Clawson, et al., 1997; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nelson & 
Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997) argued that attitude 
change can take place in two ways: altering the importance 
of an existing piece of information about an attitude object 
or directly changing the belief about an attitude object (e.g., 
from positive to negative). Aligning with Cohen’s (1963) 
insight that the media are successful at “telling people what 
to think about” (p. 16), they argued that the former consti-
tutes framing effects in that a stimulus influences one’s at-
titude indirectly through changes in perceived importance 
of certain existing considerations, while the latter represents 
persuasion in that a communicating text directly changes 
one’s attitude toward an attitude object. Supporting this 
view, Nelson, Oxley and Clawson’s (1997) experimental 
results showed that citizens’ tolerance of a racist group’s 
rally was shaped by which considerations they weighed 
more. Specifically, those exposed to a news story describing 
the rally as the disruption of public order accorded more 
importance to corresponding considerations in evaluating 
the event. 
Although Nelson and colleagues’ series of experiments 
generally support their argument that framing works through 
belief importance rather than belief change, when belief 
importance and belief change were assessed together in pre-
dicting attitude change, belief change had small but discern-
able effects on attitude change (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). 
Slothuus (2008) reconciles the discrepancy by taking into 
account perceivers’ political knowledge. his findings showed 
that for those who were politically knowledgeable, framing 
effects were mediated by perceived importance of available 
considerations, while framing effects were mediated by both 
belief importance and belief change among people with 
moderate political knowledge. That is, framing effects are 
more likely to be pronounced among the politically knowl-
edgeable, while persuasion is more common among those 
who are less politically sophisticated.
stimuli such as news stories (Price and Tewksbury, 1997). 
Sustained emphasis and justification of these considerations, 
in turn, makes them particularly usable for judgments about 
the issue in question (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; 
Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997).
More specifically, message frames can induce thoughts 
that correspond to the perspective primarily featured in the 
message. For example, Price et al. (1997) conducted an ex-
periment in which students were randomly assigned to read 
a news article about proposed state funding cuts for public 
universities in the region. With the facts being identical, each 
story highlighted different aspects of the plan such as con-
flict between citizen groups over the plan and the resultant 
tuition increases. The content-analysis of respondents’ 
thoughts showed that their attention was “directed away from 
core story elements [i.e., planned funding cuts] and toward 
ideas related to the frame in question” (Price et al., 1997, p. 
494, italics in original). Similarly, Shen (2004) found that 
political ads highlighting issue positions evoked more issue-
related thoughts than thoughts pertaining to character, while 
character-framed political ads had the opposite effect. Im-
portantly, these framing effects were so robust that frame-
corresponding thoughts were activated even when the rival 
thoughts were highly accessible from memory. 
When thoughts are generated by message frames, they 
appear to carry a specific evaluative implication in such a 
way that certain beliefs are perceived to be more important 
than before. This process can be expressed in an algebraic 
formula derived from expectancy value model of attitudes 
(Fishbein, 1963): 
Attitude	=	∑vi * wi, where vi is the evaluation of the 
object on attribute i, and wi is the salience weight 
(∑wi = 1) associated with that attribute (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007b, p. 105).
Applying this model to attitude formation regarding welfare 
policy, Nelson, Oxley, et al. (1997) observed that the coef-
ficient of beliefs about individual causes of poverty (e.g., lack 
of effort and thrift) increased in one’s attitude about welfare 
policy when people saw a news story emphasizing that peo-
ple on welfare do not deserve special treatment. In other 
words, message frames make a certain belief play a more 
important role in subsequent judgments by increasing per-
ceived importance of the belief (see N. h. Anderson, 1981). 
In an attempt to formally test the mediating role of perceived 
importance in the framing processes, Nelson and colleagues 
(e.g., Nelson, Clawson, et al., 1997; Nelson & Oxley, 1999) 
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likely to be used as political evaluation standards, not only 
because they are made more accessible, but also because the 
messages render them more suitable for political judgments 
by reinforcing their importance or relevance. In other words, 
there really are no pure accessibility effects in political com-
munication. In sum, the ostensible irrelevance between prim-
ing events and subsequent judgments does not typically 
apply to media priming contexts. 
When it comes to the mechanisms of media priming, we 
noted above that the notion of an accessibility effect neither 
consistently explains real-life situations, nor receives em-
pirical support. The largely negative coverage of President 
Clinton during Lewinsky scandal did not hurt the president’s 
approval ratings (Shah et al., 2002). Moreover, Miller and 
Krosnick (2000) found that it is people’s inference of na-
tional importance of issues from news coverage that led 
people to evaluate the president based on the issues. Like-
wise, Althaus and Kim (2006, p. 960) concluded that media 
priming effects are a product of creating associations be-
tween highlighted issues and political leaders to be evalu-
ated rather than merely increasing accessibility of issues. 
These findings suggest that increased suitability of a primed 
consideration for subsequent judgments (i.e., increased 
judged usability) is the locus of media priming effects (see 
also Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997).
Our conclusion, that media priming is not an accessibil-
ity effect, leads to the revision of the relationships among 
agenda setting, framing, and media priming as suggested by 
Price and Tewksbury (1997). Although framing can operate 
on three fronts by a) making certain considerations available, 
b) making available and corresponding considerations ac-
cessible, and c) making certain considerations more suitable 
for a given judgment (Chong & Druckman, 2007b), it is the 
rendering of a particular consideration relatively important, 
relevant, or both to a judgment through which framing ef-
fects work (Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 
1997). Therefore, it can be concluded that framing is a com-
bination of an applicability and a judged usability effect. An 
applicability effect occurs as media emphasis on a certain 
perspective increases the likelihood of activating correspond-
ing thoughts. A judged usability effect takes place as media 
messages provide information substantiating the perspective 
so that the individual can evaluate the utility of activated 
thoughts for a judgment task, provided that the perceiver has 
adequate motivation and ability to do so. Judged usability 
also relates to the evaluation of a set of activated thoughts 
Redefining the Relationships among Agenda 
Setting, Priming, and Framing
We begin this section by noting the difference between prim-
ing effects in social psychological studies and priming effects 
in mass communication research. To obviate possible confu-
sion, we now refer to priming studied in the context of mass 
communication as “media priming” and priming in social 
psychology as “simple priming.” 
Priming effects in social psychological studies are 
primarily an accessibility effect as a priming event ostensibly 
unrelated to a subsequent judgment increases accessibility of 
a certain construct without imbuing other judgmental at-
tributes (Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Druckman, 2001b). 
For example, simple priming occurs when experimental 
participants are asked to memorize either positive or negative 
trait terms (i.e., priming event) such as self-confidence or 
conceited, and then are asked to judge an ambiguous behav-
ior of another person that can be construed either way. The 
main finding is that it is a construct’s residual energy re-
tained from the priming event (i.e., increased accessibility 
of positive or negative trait terms) that subconsciously influ-
ences the judgment of an unrelated event that follows (i.e., 
ambiguous behaviors) without being confounded by any 
other attributes that may transfer from a priming stimulus. 
however, media priming is different from simple priming 
with respect to the nature of a priming stimulus and, more 
importantly, the priming mechanism. As noted by Chong 
and Druckman (2007b), presenting news stories with a sus-
tained emphasis on and substantiation of a consideration is 
fundamentally different from having people memorize words 
that are apparently unrelated to a judgment task. The media 
accounts that serve as priming stimuli often provide cues to 
issue importance, thereby justifying the use of the issue at 
hand as a political evaluation standard. Simply, the fact that 
the media would cover the issue at all conveys the notion 
that the issue is important to some extent. In some cases, a 
journalist might bring the object of a subsequent judgment, 
such as a politician, into the story in the process of covering 
an issue. Moreover, journalists are often trained to include 
information to substantiate the importance, significance, or 
implications of the issue being addressed. This practice cre-
ates a more direct linkage between news stories and subse-
quent judgments of evaluating political figures than one 
would typically observe in simple priming studies. That is, 
the issues presented in the priming news story are more 
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nation of an applicability and a judged usability effect. Me-
dia coverage of an issue increases the likelihood of activating 
thoughts related to the issue by actively discussing it (i.e., 
applicability effect). Simultaneously, news stories typically 
tell people that the issue is something to be concerned about 
by directly or indirectly suggesting its significance and con-
sequences relevant at the individual, local, state, or national 
levels. As politicians are expected to address locally and 
nationally important issues, the issues that the media portray 
as important are likely to serve as judgment standards when 
people are asked to evaluate the performance of politicians 
(see Figure 2 for the illustration of agenda-setting and media 
priming processes). That is, a primed issue is used as a 
in the process of selecting the most suitable thought for a 
given judgment (see Figure 1 for the illustration of framing 
processes). Overall, framing not only selectively activates a 
particular set of thoughts that resonate with the salient mes-
sage features, but also provides information, which can 
regulate the weight attached to those thoughts in the form 
of, for example, perceived importance, relevance, or both, 
thereby determining the use of them for a given judgment. 
Given the fact that framing and media priming share the 
same stimulus materials, media priming may intervene in 
the same cognitive processes as framing, but is only probed 
by a different dependent variable (Entman, 2007). Therefore, 
media priming may also be best conceptualized as a combi-
Figure 1. Framing Processes. The news framing process illustrates that among different aspects of an issue (i.e., stars with 
different angles), a certain aspect is chosen over others to characterize an issue or event. For example, the issue of unem-
ployment is described in terms of the cheap labor provided by immigrants (i.e., the star facing left). Exposure to the news 
story activates thoughts correspond to immigrants (i.e., the rising left-facing star) rather than thoughts related to other 
aspects of the issue (e.g., legislation, education, and cheap imports from China) and, at the same time, makes the former 
thoughts prominent by promoting their importance (i.e., growing size of the left-facing star) and relevance (i.e., bright 
shade of the star) to the understanding of the issue at hand. That is, issue perceptions are influenced by the consideration 
featured in the news story. Thoughts related to neglected considerations become relegated to the degree that thoughts 
about a featured consideration are magnified. Note that judged usability may not come into play in the transition from 
pre- to post-exposure as relevance judgment can only be made when a target judgment is given.
Judged Usability Model
33
political evaluation standard to the extent that it is deemed 
appropriate to be employed to judge a politician (Geer, 1991; 
Miller & Krosnick, 2000). As the weight the media place on 
an issue transfers to the weight people place on it as political 
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evaluation standards, media “[p]riming, then, is a name for 
the goal, the intended effect, of strategic actors’ framing 
activities” (Entman, 2007, p. 165). 
For agenda setting, the evidence reviewed above suggests 
Figure 2. Agenda-setting and Media Priming Processes. The agenda building process illustrates that news media selec-
tively features a certain issue. The issue framing process shows that the same issue can be viewed from different perspec-
tives (e.g., unemployment is explained in terms of either immigrants, legislation, education, or cheap imports from China). 
Typically, news media uses a frame to justifies the chosen issue as worthy of public attention. In other words, for example, 
regardless of frames of news stories about unemployment, people are likely to perceive that the issue deserves closer at-
tention. The transition from pre-exposure to post-exposure shows that, upon exposure to stories about an issue, existing 
thoughts corresponding to the featured issue are activated and become elevated in terms of “top-of-mindedness” (i.e., the 
rising heart). At the same time, the activated thoughts become important to the extent that the news story substantiate the 
chosen issue and, therefore, become relevant to judging what most important problem is or assessing how the President 
performs her/his job. Concurrently, unrelated thoughts are relegated, as they are overlooked, in their importance and 
relevance to the degree that the activated thoughts are magnified. Note that judged usability may not come into play in 
the transition from pre- to post-exposure as relevance judgment can only be made when a target judgment is given.
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framing effects can also explain media priming effects. That 
is, because evidence indicates that they are the same kind of 
effects with different names, a known mechanism underlying 
one effect can be applied to the other. 
We add to that model by incorporating the concept of 
judged usability to specify elements that can determine the 
use of a consideration for a given judgment. 
We begin with the following attitude formation formula: 
Attitude	=	∑vi * wi, where vi is the evaluation of the 
object on attribute i, and wi is the salience weight 
(∑wi = 1) associated with that attribute (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007b, p. 105). 
Applying this model to the example of attitude formation 
regarding a public rally by white supremacists, we might 
expect that at least two considerations to arise (e.g., free 
speech as v1 vs. public disturbance as v2). When these two 
considerations oppose each other, an individual’s attitude 
toward the object (in this case the rally) depends on the rela-
tive weights (i.e., wi) given to each attribute. Indeed, Nelson 
and his collaborators (Nelson, Clawson, et al., 1997; Nelson 
& Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997) demonstrated 
that attitudes are shaped by an attribute that receives a great-
er weight in the form of perceived importance. 
Applying the formula to media priming effects, media 
messages highlight certain considerations that assume the 
position of vi in the attitude formula. By calling attention to 
certain considerations, messages influence the relative 
weights given to considerations in making subsequent judg-
ments. For example, an issue featured in news stories may 
play a more important role than before in making political 
evaluations as the stories substantiate the importance of the 
issue. The formula suggests that while weights determine 
the relative value of competing judgment considerations, 
they also act as a gatekeeper to control the fate of activated 
considerations. Even if a consideration is brought to mind 
as it is featured in media messages, the consideration may 
not be able to play a role when it receives no weight. As such, 
simple activation of a consideration may not be sufficient to 
increase its weight in subsequent judgments. Two addition-
al factors beyond simple media attention are likely to come 
into play: evaluative media content regarding the consider-
ation and judgments about the appropriate weight of the 
consideration made by the message receiver.
First, just as message information that supports a par-
ticular consideration can increase the weight attached to it 
(see Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson, 
that it is what the messages convey about an issue that pro-
duces agenda-setting effects just like framing and media 
priming effects do. In this sense, “[a]genda setting can thus be 
seen as another name for successfully performing the first 
function of framing: defining problems worthy of public and 
government attention” (Entman, 2007, p. 164, italics in 
original). 
Above, we cited Entman (2007) to define the relation-
ships among agenda setting, framing, and media priming. 
Our intention to do so was not to argue that one type of ef-
fects subsumes the others, but to illustrate that those effects 
are closely related to one another, while surveying different 
types of judgments. News stories emphasizing a certain 
perspective or an issue inevitably bring corresponding 
thoughts to mind. At the same time, the focal perspective or 
issue is imbued with properties such as relative importance, 
relevance, and particular emotions to the extent that the 
content of the stories promote such attributes. When judg-
ment tasks such as MIP perceptions and political evaluations 
are given, a consideration with higher values is likely to play 
a more pivotal role in shaping a given judgment. Therefore, 
framing and media priming are theoretically indistinguish-
able as they share underlying cognitive processes (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007b, 2007a; Entman, 2007, 2010). Likewise, 
agenda setting and media priming are two of a kind in that 
both of the effects are a product of news media’s conven-
tional practices of portraying issues as deserving particular 
attention, while differing largely in terms of the subsequent 
judgments made (Entman, 2007). Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that framing, media priming, and agenda setting 
share common cognitive processes as a result of the nature 
of news reporting, albeit “scholars often seem to choose 
among the three terms based less on theoretical distinctions 
among them than on the dependent variable of interest” 
(Entman, 2007, p. 171).
The Judged Usability Model
In this section, we propose the Judged Usability Model. The 
conclusion we made earlier, that is, framing and media prim-
ing “share common processes, and the two terms can be used 
interchangeably” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 115), im-
plies that the Expectancy-value Model of attitudes (Fishbein, 
1963) that some scholars (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007a, 
2007b; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997) have used to explain 
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(Devine, 1989; higgins, 1996; Kruglanski, 1989). Our con-
ceptualization also aligns with the notion that attitude is a 
summary evaluation of beliefs that are germane to the atti-
tude object (Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Nelson, Oxley, et 
al., 1997). Our adapted judgment formula is as follows:
Judgment	=	∑Ui * Ei, where Ui is the judged usability 
of consideration i, and Ei is the evaluation of the target 
on consideration i. 
Our model implies two opposite routes that a given consid-
eration can take in the judgment making processes. A con-
sideration can exert greater influence to the extent that it is 
deemed usable and the evaluation of the target judgment 
becomes more extreme (either positive or negative). Alterna-
tively, if either of those values is close to nil, the consider-
ation is nullified. Such situations might result from a 
consideration that is deemed unusable (e.g., President 
Obama’s preference for St. Louis-style pizza over Chicago-
style pizza) or if the target is evaluated as being neutral or 
unknown (e.g., either president’s handling of the economy 
is seen as being neither positive nor negative or the individ-
ual does not have enough information to make a judgment), 
in each case causing the given consideration to be inappli-
cable to the targeted judgment (e.g., the evaluation of the 
president’s performance). 
This Judged Usability Model can be more readily ob-
served in the conscious mental calculus that people use to 
make high involvement decisions like buying a new car. In 
such high involvement situations where there are greater 
personal relevance and consequences (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979), people are motivated to exert considerable mental 
effort into making the judgment (Chaiken, 1980). This judg-
ment process may begin with an active attempt to identify 
relevant considerations (e.g., price, fuel efficiency, drive type, 
safety features, convenience features, options, and packages). 
For each candidate car, individuals then rate each criterion 
in terms of how good or bad a certain feature is (e.g., good 
vs. bad fuel economy) and how important the feature is (e.g., 
fuel economy and convenience features may not be impor-
tant for those looking for a sports car). As high involvement 
situations like this are conducive to generating more topic-
related thoughts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) and evaluating 
given evidence more thoroughly (Chaiken, 1980), the com-
plexity of the judgment formula and the mental effort re-
quired to come to a conclusion depend on the level of issue 
involvement. While individuals do not often take the addi-
tional step of quantifying each of these evaluations and 
Oxley, et al., 1997), the consideration that is discredited is 
likely to lose weight to the point where it becomes nil, which 
in turn eliminates that consideration from a mental calculus. 
That is, a message may implicitly or explicitly attack the 
importance of a given consideration. Simply put, messages 
may influence whether and how a certain consideration is 
used in forming attitudes and making evaluations through 
selective emphasis and varying degrees of substantiation. 
Second, the premise that weight determines the fate of 
activated considerations aligns with the concept of judged 
usability. Scholars have noted that among thoughts that are 
activated, only those deemed appropriate (or relevant) to a 
judgment (i.e., those that have sufficient judged usability) 
are used to shape that judgment, while others are disre-
garded (higgins, 1996; higgins & Bargh, 1987; Price & 
Tewksbury, 1997). This gatekeeping process “occurs after 
knowledge activation but before knowledge use” (higgins, 
1996, p. 152, italics in original). For example, with equal 
knowledge of African American pejorative stereotypes, low-
prejudice white individuals were less likely to exhibit such 
beliefs than high prejudice subjects when they were primed 
with racial stereotypes (Devine, 1989). In this case, the pre-
dispositions of low-prejudice individuals suppressed the ac-
tivated considerations when making subsequent judgments. 
Motives and goals can also act as a mental filter that regu-
lates judged usability of activated thoughts. For example, 
priming a fear of invalidity led people to avoid the immedi-
ate use of activated thoughts and seek alternatives (Kruglan-
ski, 1989). Overall, the characteristics of judged usability are 
squarely aligned with the function of weight in the attitude 
formation formula discussed above, that is, determining the 
perceived utility of an activated consideration in judgment-
making process. 
Based on our observation that the fate of activated con-
siderations is malleable, we propose “The Judged Usability 
Model” by incorporating the concept of judged usability to 
further specify elements that can determine the fate of con-
siderations. This model is based on the attitude formation 
formula	discussed	above	(i.e.,	Attitude	=	∑vi * wi,). however, 
we incorporate judged usability (Ui) as the weight component 
(wi). We also use the label Ei in the place of vi to denote the 
evaluation of the judgment target using each usable consid-
eration. Again, the way we incorporate Ui as the weight 
component (wi) in the consideration attitude allows for the 
possibility that unusable considerations can be eliminated 
in the winnowing process of making judgments (i.e., Ui = 0) 
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vaded many Asian countries and committed numerous war 
atrocities during the World War II can be generally seen as 
something to be worthy of attention. however, when the 
Japanese acts of aggression are contemplated in the context 
of a car-buying decision, they may not be seen as intrinsi-
cally relevant to the decision about whether or not to buy a 
Japanese car. By contrast, the consideration that the auto-
mobile in question comes standard with cargo netting is 
intrinsically relevant in the sense that cargo nets come into 
play in the day-to-day use of the car, but the cargo netting 
may be seen as an unimportant feature. To be applicable to 
the car-buying decision, a consideration must be both im-
portant and relevant (e.g., high fuel efficiency or reliability 
ratings).
Also noteworthy is that the assessment of these elements 
is subjective in nature and thus will vary from person to 
person. In the above example, consumers in Korea and 
China, two of many countries that were devastated by the 
Japanese invasion, are more likely to assign higher values to 
both perceived importance and relevance of the historical 
facts than consumers in South America, where Japanese 
colonialism had virtually no influence. 
Findings illustrate that these attributes can play a role in 
winnowing unusable considerations. Perceived importance 
was found to filter unimportant issues in the context of 
evaluating presidential performance. Miller and Krosnick 
(2000) demonstrated that influence of issue considerations 
on presidential performance evaluations was a function of 
how important those issues were perceived to be. More di-
rectly, Geer (1991) found that only issues deemed important 
were cited as the basis for presidential voting decisions, even 
though important and unimportant issues were equally 
primed. 
Similarly, a consideration perceived to be irrelevant to 
the judgment at hand may fail to receive further consider-
ation. Although not designed to demonstrate the effect of 
perceived relevance on usability judgments, Matthes (2006) 
found that the perception of irrelevance prevents further 
attention to the irrelevant issues (see also McCombs, 2004). 
These findings illustrate that the suggested elements can 
function as a filter that screens out activated considerations 
that do not have utility for a target judgment.
Evaluations. 
Evaluations refer to valenced beliefs involving a given 
consideration (e.g., positive vs. negative, favorable vs. 
aggregating them to make the purchase decision, the above 
equation may to some degree represent the judgment process 
used in such high involvement decisions. 
Of course, most of the decisions that individuals make 
on a daily basis are low-involvement decisions that lack the 
necessary motivation to engage in exhaustive evaluations. 
Such situations may be much simpler in several respects. For 
instance, they may involve identifying fewer considerations 
and less effortful evaluation of them. The judgment process 
may be less conscious and more automatic, and individuals 
may resort to more simple and efficient heuristic shortcuts 
to make judgments. The distinction between such high and 
low involvement judgment situations is represented in the 
central vs. peripheral routes to the persuasion in Petty and 
Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Ca-
cioppo, 2012) and the heuristic vs. systemic information 
processing of Chaiken’s (1987) heuristic-Systematic Model. 
Though high and low involvement judgments may vary in 
terms of the number and nature of considerations used, as 
well the effort and strategies used to make decisions, we still 
argue that judgments are made by some level of assessment 
of at least one consideration.
Judged Usability Standards
Importance and relevance. 
The judged usability of a consideration itself is also a com-
posite judgment. Among many possible standards of judged 
usability (Croizet & Fiske, 2000), our model stresses the two 
attributes that media messages may affect (N. h. Anderson, 
1981; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997; Van der Pligt & Eiser, 
1984): the perceived importance of a consideration (Ii) and its 
relevance to the judgment at hand (Ri). Perceived importance 
refers to subjective judgments about the degree to which a 
consideration per se is worthy of attention. Relevance indi-
cates how intrinsically linked a consideration is to the judg-
ment decision one is about to make. We can illustrate this 
point by transforming the original judgment equation that 
we posed above as:
Judgment	=	∑	Ii * Ri * Ei, where Ii is the perceived 
importance of consideration i, Ri is the perceived 
relevance of consideration i. and Ei is the evaluation 
of consideration i. 
These two components of consideration usability are to some 
degree independent. For example, the fact that Japan in-
Judged Usability Model
37 2020, 8, 17-50
able outside the womb), but who are unable to make a satis-
factory judgment about which side is correct may find it hard 
to base their abortion position on the “life begins” consider-
ation. As a result, alternative considerations that can provide 
more definitive implications are likely to be sought.
Judgment Certainty
The judgment components discussed above have their own 
levels of certainty. People form a belief about a judgment 
object with a certain level of confidence (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
& Lichtenstein, 1977). The more certain one is about a judg-
ment object, the smaller the latitude of acceptance the person 
has to a set of ideas different from her own (Sherif & hov-
land, 1961). Thus, the level of certainty reduces the scope 
within which potential message effects can operate.
In terms of the mode of information processing, a sense 
of uncertainty can lead to systematic information processing 
(i.e., thorough consideration of message arguments; see 
Chaiken, 1980), thereby increasing potential message effects. 
By contrast, a sense of certainty seems to encourage using 
superficial shortcuts during information processing (i.e., 
heuristic processing). For example, Tiedens and Linton 
(2001) found that people who experienced certainty were 
more likely to process information superficially, relying on 
the expertise of a source and stereotypes, whereas those who 
felt uncertainty were more likely to be affected by argument 
quality. In the above contexts, uncertainty is a situational 
characteristic. however, tolerance for uncertainty, a more 
stable personality trait, may also come into play to influence 
strategies used to reduce uncertainty. Individuals who are 
high in tolerance for uncertainty tend to favor systematic 
information processing strategies, while those high in need 
for closure gravitate toward heuristic processing (Kruglan-
ski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009). 
While uncertainty provides room for a communicating 
text to have intended effects, media messages can also create 
uncertainty. Researchers have noted that journalists, follow-
ing the canons of objectivity, often report both sides of a 
social or scientific controversy even in situations when the 
preponderance of evidence supports one side. For example, 
Gelbspan’s (1998) study of the global warming controversy 
found that media messages gave equal attention to minor 
opinions as much as the scientific consensus. Similarly, 
Dearing’s (1995) content analysis of news stories regarding 
fringe scientific theories such as an alternative cause of 
unfavorable, or true vs. false). Presidential performance judg-
ments, for example, consist of a combination of positive and 
negative evaluations of the president’s economic steward-
ship, foreign-policy performance, and the like. In the judg-
ment	formula	presented	above	(i.e.,	Judgment	=	∑Ui * Ei), 
the usability standards and evaluation are multiplied in a 
way that if either component is essentially nil, a consider-
ation becomes inapplicable to a judgment. Thus, even if a 
consideration is deemed usable, one has to have an evalua-
tion of the consideration in order to apply it to a given judg-
ment. This may involve two somewhat related processes: a) 
people should have evidence on which they can evaluate a 
consideration, and b) be reasonably certain that their evalu-
ations are sufficiently valid.
Evidence (e.g., factual claims, past experience, and infer-
ences from predisposition or values) enables people to form 
evaluations about a given consideration that has the func-
tional value of making decisions with less evaluative effort 
(Fazio, Blascovich, & Driscoll, 1992). Conversely, the ab-
sence of evidence may force individuals to extend greater 
effort to make the evaluation “on the spot,” which may cause 
people to simply turn to alternative considerations for which 
evaluations are readily available instead of investing their 
time and energy to establish one (Schuman & Presser, 1980; 
see also Zaller, 1992). Furthermore, considerations remain 
unevaluated may have no utility for future judgments. For 
example, if one is unable to evaluate the “life begins at con-
ception” consideration in terms of whether it is true or false, 
that consideration does not provide any evaluative direction 
for a judgment about whether abortion should be legal, and 
thus is likely to inapplicable to that judgment.
In light of factors like available evidence, past experience, 
and value predispositions, individuals need to feel assured, 
at least to some degree, that their evaluative beliefs are valid 
enough to guide a given judgment. Possessing dubious eval-
uations may make people less inclined to make judgments 
based on those evaluations (cf. Croizet & Fiske, 2000). As 
such, creating uncertainty about an evaluative belief may 
take a significant toll on the utility of that belief. Evidence 
suggests that an ambivalent attitude causes individuals to 
avoid making decisions (hänze, 2001; Jonas, Diehl, & 
Brömer, 1997) or to seek alternative grounds for a given 
judgment (Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997). Thus, for ex-
ample, people who think both sides of the abortion issue 
make reasonable claims as to when human life begins (e.g., 
life begins at conception vs. life begins after the fetus is vi-
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On a related note, media messages may encourage people 
to assess the usability of activated considerations, for ex-
ample, by providing information that is useful for the evalu-
ation, that relates people to the issue that is being discussed, 
or both. That is, for example, a news story that addresses the 
importance and relevance of the featured consideration for 
a judgment can be facilitative of judging usability of the 
consideration by reducing the need for seeking further infor-
mation or inferring it from the facts provided. Similarly, a 
news story that hints at an issue’s impact on people (e.g., 
alluding to the impact of a naval port construction on sea 
farming) may invite them (e.g., sea farmers) to ruminate on 
relevant considerations. In this sense, judged usability could 
be a media effect. 
Regarding evaluations, a great deal of empirical evidence 
indicates that evaluative beliefs about a consideration can be 
shaped in line with central ideas of a communicating text 
(Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Page 
& Shapir, 1992). If a news story about a regional develop-
ment plan is framed in environmental impact terms, for 
example, people’s evaluations about environmental impacts 
of the plan become pessimistic (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). Such 
changes in the content of evaluation result from the merits 
of information substantiating arguments presented in a me-
dia message and the appreciation of the merits by the audi-
ence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 2012; 
Zaller, 1992). That is, factual information provided by the 
messages has the potential to serve as a basis of the content 
of an evaluation (Danes, hunter, & Woelfel, 1978; Nelson, 
Oxley, et al., 1997). 
Reverse Agenda Setting and Reverse Priming
The conclusion we made above that media messages can 
regulate judgment components (i.e., importance, relevance, 
and evaluation) leads to another important implication: Just 
as news messages can promote the use of a given consider-
ation in subsequent judgments, they may also suppress a 
given consideration such that it is less likely to be named as 
the MIP (i.e., reverse agenda setting) or serve as a political 
evaluation standard (i.e., reverse priming) than the baseline.4
AIDS and cold fusion illustrates that maverick scientific 
theories that contradict predominant scientific findings were 
lent credibility by journalists. Findings suggest that such a 
treatment by the media can breed the sense of uncertainty 
about a given issue (Corbett & Durfee, 2004), which then 
opens one up to media effects. In fact, this may explain the 
persistence of discredited beliefs such as the denial of global 
warming or the belief in the link between childhood vaccina-
tions and autism. 
Message Effects and the Judged Usability
Messages may influence judgments by actively raising or 
lowering a consideration’s judged usability by addressing the 
importance and relevance of a given consideration. In the 
case of presidential performance evaluations, a message may 
stress the importance (or unimportance) of the economy. The 
message may also address the relevance of the economic con-
sideration by making the case that the president plays a 
significant role (or insignificant, for example, by suggesting 
that important elements and factors of economic success are 
beyond the president’s control) in guiding the health of the 
economy. 
The findings of previous studies indicate that media mes-
sages can be successful in altering the importance and rele-
vance elements by presenting interpretations of an issue that 
revolve around the chosen consideration (e.g., Krosnick & 
Kinder, 1990; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Nelson, Clawson, 
et al., 1997; Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 
1997). For example, Nelson and Oxley (1999) demonstrated 
that news story frames shaped audience understanding of an 
urban development plan by highlighting the importance and 
relevance of either economic or environmental consider-
ations. Of course, news frames may also be substantiated by 
frame-consistent facts that address the certainty component 
of judged usability and thereby gaining additional influence. 
Thus, framing effects operate by activating the featured 
consideration inherent in the frame, making it more likely 
to be deemed important and relevant, and in some cases 
more certain, elevating that consideration’s role in subse-
quent judgments (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, et al., 1997; Nelson 
& Oxley, 1999; Nelson, Oxley, et al., 1997). 
4 Some scholars (e.g., Dodel, Comesaña, & Blanc, 2019) use the term reverse-agenda setting to refer to a reverse causation of agenda 
setting (e.g., the public set agendas for political elites). For the lack of a better term, we use the term reverse to refer to reducing the like-
lihood of using a consideration for a given judgment. 
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occur through controlling knowledge activation. As knowl-
edge activation is a function of accessibility and applicabil-
ity (higgins, 1989), lowering accessibility, applicability, or a 
combination of both can inhibit activation of certain consid-
erations, thereby reducing the likelihood of those thoughts 
being used for cognitive tasks. Lowering accessibility can 
only be attained by ignoring target thoughts (i.e., omission) 
or by promoting rival thoughts and ignoring target thoughts 
simultaneously for stronger effects (i.e., distraction) (higgins 
& Brendl, 1995; Zhu, 1992) because a simple mentioning of 
a consideration is sufficient to increase the accessibility of 
that consideration (Carpentier, 2014; Miller, 2007). 
Anecdotally, Bill Clinton’s famous campaign slogan, “It’s 
the economy, stupid,” embodied a campaign strategy that 
successfully muted other issues by exclusively promoting the 
ailing economy as the top priority. Empirically, lack of news 
coverage is found to impact the standards by which citizens 
evaluate political actors (e.g., Iyengar et al., 1982) and the 
perceptions of issue importance (e.g., Iyengar & Simon, 
1993). Iyengar and colleagues’ (Iyengar et al., 1984) study is 
particularly illustrative to this point. In their experiment, 
participants were assigned to one of three television news 
viewing conditions––high, intermediate and no coverage of 
three different issues including energy, defense, and infla-
tion. After watching the news, respondents were asked to 
judge the importance of various national problems and pres-
idential performance. Results showed that there was a posi-
tive relationship between the amount of exposure and the 
likelihood of those issues influencing presidential perfor-
mance evaluations and being cited as the MIP. In other 
words, though all of the issues studied have potential to be 
seen as impactful, it is the existence of media coverage that 
determines the actual use of the issues in people’s judgments. 
Likewise, the surge of the Iran-Contra scandal coverage ef-
fectively immediately muted the impact of welfare policies 
on presidential evaluations (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). 
Similarly, prior activation of competing considerations 
can inhibit subsequent activation of target considerations. 
Considerations exhibit “hydraulic effects” in which the el-
evation of one consideration is associated with the simulta-
neous lowering of other considerations (N.-J. Lee, McLeod, 
& Shah, 2008; Pan & Kosicki, 1997). higgins (1996) pointed 
out that rival constructs tend to compete with each other for 
activation such that a construct activated first inhibits its 
rival from rising above the threshold of consciousness. Al-
though not designed to test this hypothesis, Geer (1991) 
These potential cognitive effects that expand traditional 
conceptions of agenda-setting and priming effects may occur 
in response to three different journalistic practices: a) ignor-
ing a particular consideration (i.e., omission); b) accentuat-
ing other competing considerations (i.e., distraction); and c) 
attacking the viability of a potential consideration (i.e., 
trivialization). Examples of such practices can be found in 
McLeod and hertog’s (1999) discussion of media coverage 
of anarchist protests. In covering one protest outside Pills-
bury headquarters, journalists exhibited the practice of omis-
sion by failing to note the protesters’ central critique that 
Pillsbury’s Burger King brand was contributing to the de-
struction of the rain forest by buying Brazilian beef. News 
stories engaged in distraction by emphasizing the protesters’ 
conflict with the police, rather than their intended adversary, 
Pillsbury. The reports also exemplified trivialization by 
emphasizing various aspects of protester deviance to down-
grade the legitimacy of considerations raised by the protest-
ers. Such practices may reduce the potential influence of a 
particular consideration when audience members engage in 
subsequent judgments and experiences relevant to issues 
being raised. From the perspective of media use, audiences 
actively use certain news outlets that provide particular at-
tributes of unfolding issues or events (Weaver, Wojdynski, 
McKeever, & Shaw, 2010). This media use pattern may result 
in creating the association between a certain attribute (e.g., 
unimportant) with an issue in people’s minds (Vargo, Guo, 
McCombs, & Shaw, 2014). As a result, an issue that the 
media portray as unimportant is likely to be imbued with 
the attribute, and thus be disregarded when people make 
political judgments (Geer, 1991; Martin, 1986).
The reverse agenda setting and reverse priming potential 
of messages can also be substantiated within the framework 
of the predominant cognitive processing model. The social-
psychological literature (e.g., higgins, 1996; higgins & 
Bargh, 1987) has long observed that priming effects are a 
product of two parts, one is to activate a certain consider-
ation by a stimulus material (i.e., priming) and the other is 
to evaluate the goodness of fit between activated consider-
ations and a subsequent judgment (i.e., judged usability). For 
example, a choice of what to prime (e.g., higgins & Brendl, 
1995; higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) and what criteria to 
evoke in evaluating primed considerations (e.g., Devine, 
1989; Kruglanski, 1989) can independently make a differ-
ence in priming effects. 
First, reverse agenda setting and reverse priming can 
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macy” (higgins, 1996, p. 162). Because activated knowledge 
deemed inappropriate, irrelevant, or both is screened out 
before its actual use, not all activated knowledge plays a role. 
In this sense, controlling knowledge use can be seen as the 
second barrier to the use of activated constructs. 
Media messages can actively attack a consideration to 
render it unworthy of attention (i.e., trivialization) or less 
relevant to the issue in question (i.e., sidelining) as a way of 
reducing its usability for a given judgment. To date, most of 
the messages that were examined in previous priming and 
agenda-setting research have been framed to highlight the 
consequences and implications of the issue in question in 
accordance with traditional journalistic news values, there-
by rendering activated issue-related thoughts usable for po-
litical evaluations. 
This may not be always the case, however, especially in 
the partisan environment of contemporary media and poli-
tics. The partisan leaning of news organizations, as well as 
partisan columnists and bloggers, may foster more active 
attempts to challenge or trivialize a particular consideration. 
An example can be found in explicit differences of opinion 
on the relative threat posed by the size of the U.S. federal 
deficit. Gerald Seib, a right-leaning columnist for The Wall 
Street Journal, argued that Standard and Poor’s downgrading 
of the U.S. government’s debt rating signals the “stark real-
ity” of grave consequences of the federal debt (Seib, 2011). 
By contrast, Floyd Norris, a columnist at The New York Times, 
dismissed concerns about the federal deficit, claiming that 
the national debt would soon become “livable” even “with-
out Congress doing anything” (Norris, 2011). Among those 
who read The New York Times column, the usability of U.S. 
credit rating would decrease for MIP judgments and presi-
dential performance evaluations because it is described as 
the kind of issue that occurs and should be resolved sponta-
neously, having nothing to do with the Obama administra-
tion’s handling of the economy. 
Another example is Paul Krugman’s (2015) column about 
the Keystone XL oil pipeline extension plan. Krugman 
claimed that the job creation effects of the project, as its 
proponents argued, was not an important consideration. 
Krugman begins by admitting that “[b]uilding Keystone XL 
could slightly increase U.S. employment. In fact, it might 
replace almost 5 percent of the jobs America has lost because 
of destructive cuts in federal spending.” The Nobel laureate 
then portrayed the job creation consideration as insignificant 
by arguing that:
provided indirect evidence for this point. In his experiment, 
after reading one of the three articles about President Bush’s 
handling of issues considered by participants to be impor-
tant, unimportant or irrelevant, participants stated reasons 
for voting or not voting for the president in the upcoming 
election. A content analysis of their responses revealed that, 
although news articles failed to promote issues unimportant 
or irrelevant to voting decisions as voting criteria, they sub-
stantially weakened the role of important issues in voting 
decisions. These findings suggest that even though attempts 
to prime certain thoughts (i.e., unimportant and irrelevant 
issues) fail, such attempts may inhibit the use of rival 
thoughts (i.e., important issues) (see also Newman & Ule-
man, 1990). 
In addition to altering accessibility of issues, the nature 
of a media message, especially how it frames certain issues, 
can influence applicability of alternative perspectives of an 
issue (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Perspectives not applicable 
to message frames are less likely to be activated, and thus 
having low likelihood of affecting one’s judgments. Substan-
tial evidence indicates that message frames can induce cor-
responding thoughts, while suppressing rival considerations 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Nelson, Clawson, et al., 1997; Price 
et al., 1997; F. Shen, 2004; L. Shen, 2010). To illustrate this 
point, F. Shen (2004) found that political ads highlighting 
issue positions evoked more issue-related thoughts than 
thoughts pertaining to character, while character-framed 
political ads had the opposite effect. More importantly, these 
findings held true regardless of chronic accessibility, suggest-
ing that applicability overrides accessibility in such a way 
that frame-corresponding thoughts become activated at the 
expense of rival considerations regardless of whether the 
rival thoughts are always highly accessible from memory. In 
a similar vein, higgins and Brendl’s (1995) “Activation rule 
3” illustrates that even though a certain consideration is ac-
cessible, framing an issue in a way that renders a rival con-
sideration applicable activates the latter instead of the former. 
Consequently, the previously accessible thought is not likely 
to play a role in priming processes because it fails to be acti-
vated. In sum, framing can selectively activate applicable 
thoughts, while inhibiting the activation of non-applicable 
alternatives.
Although activated knowledge has a heightened likeli-
hood of being used for cognitive tasks, its actual use “de-
pends on the knowledge meeting some accuracy criteria 
rather than its speed or ease of activation or its simple pri-
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processing time and attention (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007), allocating more attention and space is likely to lead 
viewers to infer relative importance of particular consider-
ations even though they are not explicitly promoted. Thus, 
issues or perspectives given less space and attention in a news 
article become relatively marginalized. In addition, consid-
erations that are placed more prominently in a news story 
(e.g., in the lead or high up in a newspaper story as opposed 
to further down in the story) are more likely to be seen as 
more important. Moreover, similar to issue framing, other 
content elements such as photographs (Zillmann, Gibson, 
& Sargent, 1999) and slanted headlines (Geer & Kahn, 1993) 
that highlight particular interpretations over others may 
prevent neglected aspects from being activated.
Conclusion
This theoretical analysis of the cognitive effects literature 
sheds important light on mass communication effects such 
as agenda setting, framing, and media priming. Despite the 
long history and the immense volume of research on the 
cognitive effects of mass communication, there remains 
considerable confusion over the processes through which 
such effects occur as well as over their relationships to each 
other. For example, some argue that framing is a secondary 
effect of agenda setting, and media priming is an extension 
of agenda setting, whereas others have maintained that both 
media priming and agenda setting are a product of framing 
effects. Amid this confusion, we raised a fundamental ques-
tion as to whether these types of effects that share the same 
stimulus messages and examine perceptions of a similar sort 
have different underlying processes. If those effects occur 
via the same psychological routes, it would be safe to con-
clude that agenda setting, framing, and media priming are 
just different names for the same media effects that imbue 
an object (e.g., issues and considerations) with certain at-
tributes, but are examined with different dependent variables 
according to different judgment contexts. 
A comprehensive examination of current evidence indi-
cates that agenda setting, framing, and media priming effects 
in fact share the same cognitive processes. Although news 
stories as a stimulus bring to mind thoughts related to the 
attended features of the message, it is particular properties 
such as importance judgment and negative emotions imbued 
by the message content that mediate those media effects 
And the job gains from the pipeline would, as I said, 
be only a tiny fraction — less than 5 percent — of the 
job losses from sequestration, which in turn are only 
part of the damage done by spending cuts in general. 
(para. 11)
The numbers being thrown around are tiny com-
pared with the country’s overall work force. And in 
any case, the jobs argument for the pipeline is basi-
cally a sick joke coming from people who have done 
all they can to destroy American jobs — and are now 
employing the very arguments they used to ridicule 
government job programs to justify a big giveaway to 
their friends in the fossil fuel industry. (para. 12)
his column, if understood as intended, may call into ques-
tion the importance and relevance of the job creation effects 
of the project, thereby rendering it less influential, or even 
screened out, when individuals try to make up their minds 
about the project. Similarly, issues that are described as re-
solved or no longer significant are less likely to be cited as 
the MIP (Miller, 2007). 
As such, information sources, especially partisan media, 
may tell people not only “what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, 
p.16), but also “what not to think about” by marginalizing 
or downplaying certain issues so that trivialized issues 
should be screened out in making political judgments. Since 
judged usability can be decreased by directly dealing with 
target issues, reverse agenda setting and reverse priming of 
this sort can be seen as direct in nature. Also, attacking the 
usability of issues can be accompanied by promoting compet-
ing issues. Because people tend to fill a temporary cognitive 
vacuum created by the suppression of a certain idea with 
alternatives (N.-J. Lee et al., 2008; Price et al., 1997; Zhu, 
1992), presenting viable alternatives while discounting target 
considerations is likely to expedite or intensify reverse agen-
da setting and reverse priming effects. 
Other Reverse Agenda Setting and Reverse 
Priming Mechanisms. 
In addition to the processes discussed above, reverse agenda 
setting and reverse priming effects may be triggered by var-
ious journalistic practices such as juxtaposition, visual 
enhancement, and slanted headlines. Juxtaposition refers to 
presenting competing issues or perspectives within a text in 
a way that spatially accentuates one over the other. Since 
perceived importance can be dependent upon the amount of 
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(Miller, 2007; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Nelson, Oxley, et 
al., 1997). In other words, rather than seeing accessibility 
solely responsible for some of the effects and applicability for 
others, it can be concluded that the enhanced fit between 
issues discussed in the message and a given judgment (i.e., 
judged usability) produces agenda setting, framing, and 
media priming effects. Indeed, given that news stories in-
evitably describe events and issues in a way that gives certain 
considerations related to the story more emphasis than oth-
ers, meanings gleaned by the audience are likely to be simi-
larly skewed. This basic principle of elevated considerations 
is common to each of the cognitive effects identified above. 
Based on the conclusion we made above that cognitive 
media effects models including agenda setting, framing, and 
media priming occur through the same processes, we believe 
that	the	attitude	formation	formula	(i.e.,	Attitude	=	∑vi * wi), 
which typically is used to explain framing effects, can be 
generalized to agenda setting and media priming. In turn, 
we incorporate the concept of judged usability, which evi-
dence indicates plays a mediating role, into the formula so 
it can more precisely identify the elements determining the 
fate of considerations and illustrate the processes underlying 
those effects. Thus, the Judged Usability Model is an ex-
trapolation of reconceptualizing agenda setting, framing, 
and media priming as media effects that share the same 
psychological mechanisms. 
The	Judged	Usability	Model	(i.e.,	Judgment	=	∑	Ii * Ri * 
Ei) applies perceived importance (i.e., Ii) and relevance (i.e., Ri) 
in place of the rather vague concept of weight in the formula 
(i.e., wi) for each consideration used to evaluate a target (e.g., 
a president’s job performance) and then aggregated into a 
summary judgment. While importance is congruent with 
the previous conceptualization of weight (N. h. Anderson, 
1981; Van der Pligt & Eiser, 1984), our updated formula in-
cludes the impact that a message can have not only on raising 
or lowering the salience of various considerations, but also 
on affecting their judged usability for subsequent judgments. 
Our model is fairly simple to apply to a range of judgment 
contexts in which individuals weigh various considerations. 
Also noteworthy is that the way each component of The 
Judged Usability Model is specified illuminates a dormant 
aspect of media priming research–by altering the values of 
the elements, media messages can not only promote a certain 
consideration for a judgment (i.e., media priming), but also 
can displace one in the judgment-making process (i.e., 
reverse agenda setting and reverse priming). Though not 
fully explored to date, neither theoretically nor empirically, 
examples of potential reverse agenda setting and reverse 
priming can be seen in all types of news coverage. Political 
strategists routinely attempt to bury issues that play to their 
candidate’s weakness and opponent’s strengths, which may 
be just as important as raising issues that favor the strength 
of their candidate (West, 2005). When media messages, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, reduce the viabil-
ity of certain considerations in the pool of political evalua-
tion standards, there are considerable political implications. 
Thus, researchers can provide a more comprehensive picture 
of the interaction between mediated messages and subse-
quent political judgments by taking reverse agenda setting 
and reverse priming into account.
In summary, there are three main contributions of this 
theoretical review: a) redefining and further specifying the 
relationships among agenda setting, framing, and media 
priming; b) proposing a refined model of cognitive media 
effects, the Judged Usability Model; and c) identifying the 
reverse agenda setting and reverse priming hypotheses, a 
logical extension of our new model that describes a phenom-
enon that can often be observed in social and political life. 
In the process, we hope to resolve theoretical conflicts over 
the nature of cognitive media effects and offer a meaningful 
framework for further systematic investigations.
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